This article engages with knowledge management in governing vulnerable polar areas and tourism. Since the 1870's Svalbard has been a cruise tourism destination. Due to less ice during the summer period, the number of tourists visiting the remote northeast corner of the archipelago has increased significantly and the potential negative impact on this vulnerable natural environment has become an issue. The standard modes of managing these areas have either been to apply the precautionary principle or measures based on scientific evidence. As management models, both principles are however, for a number of reasons contested. This paper argues for a third model, partly practiced based on a form of monitoring knowledge circulating in 'communities of practice' developed over time. This form of knowledge constitute viable expertise for governing and management of the environment-tourism nexus in the areas but needs to be acknowledged as a complementary management platform. The article demonstrates how such monitoring can be done, and suggests some principles for developing monitoring knowledge for administrative and management puposes.
Introduction
Knowledge is today understood as being multiple, with multiple claims of representing reality (Sandercock 1998) . Knowledge has a variety of sources and forms. According to Gibbons et al. (1994) , there is a growing heterogeneity in the types of knowledge production and a much greater diversity of the sites at which knowledge is produced. The single epistemological ideal of a neutral view from nowhere has been replaced by multiple views (Nowotny et al. 2003) .
Within the sociology of knowledge there has been an emphasis on exploring how scientific knowledge is contested by other types of expertise, and by lay knowledge (Wynne 1996) .
'Only when the "ivory tower" is opened up and experts come to the "agora" is it possible to find out what elements they provide to formulate and implement policy decisions, and how these elements are actually used' (Liberatore and Funtowicz 2003: 147) . However, there is a variety of ways to agora, from patronizing and marketing approaches, and informing the public about science and technology, to genuine debates on the way a problem is formulated, and how knowledge is developed and uncertainties dealt with. The problem of understanding and defining uncertainty is large, complex, and nearly intractable, making evidence-based decisions difficult. Uncertainty is also why the precautionary principle tends to be called upon in issues related to the environment. This is also the case in Svalbard. Due to increasing traffic, a more strict regulation was suggested for East Svalbard, and in lack of scientific knowledge the precautionary principle was called upon. This new regulation soon became contested, particularly criticized by the tourism industry, and also disputed among academics. Hagen et al. (2012) reviewed the existing knowledge of "effects on fauna, vegetation and cultural heritage" (ibid.: 2). Their general conclusion is that there are many holes in the stock of knowledge necessary to manage the area properly. They relay their arguments on published, scientific data, and not administrative data and different forms of tacit knowledge that also are in use in the actual practices of management. We do not argue against the need for better scientific evidence, we argue however that there exists a huge and viable stock of information, from field inspections of the Governor's office and reports from different stakeholders that do not seem to be valued. Our argument is that there is a "community of
practice" producing what we call monitoring data, which also should be included in the stock of knowledge provided for a sustainable management of the environment and the environment-tourism nexus on Svalbard.
The aim of this article is to highlight other means to achieve reliable knowledge than the scientific standard model, and that uncertainties can be managed through other methods than by applying the precautionary principle. In the case study we argue, although the available scientific knowledge was limited, evidence sufficient for management measures existed.
Evidence-based decisions

Scientific and monitoring knowledge
The character and significance of scientific knowledge is a matter of debate within scientific communities and in society in general. One of the problems with knowledge as a base for management decisions is that the research community is not univocal. Also, most researchbased knowledge can be interpreted in different ways, and even more important, it is rarely evident how it should be transformed into decisions. Moreover, scientific knowledge is seldom updated, complete, unambiguous, and comprehensive -and often alternative and even contradictory evidence exists. Research is by nature based on past or present observations, whereas decisions give direction for a future in which the circumstances always are more or less unknown. Besides, in environmental issues, the scientific knowledge of an area tends to be scattered, or anecdotal (Hagen et al. 2012) , and can never cover all aspects of nature.
Within the scientific community itself, unison accordance concerning interpretation of a situation or research results hardly occurs, and even less when results are about to be translated into politics. Thus, it is not equally realistic to expect all decisions to be 'evidenceproofed' (Head 2008:5) , or found on levels above epistemological differences. This means that there is competing evidence, and alternative expert groups in the field. Van Dijk et al. (2011) , studying health politics, claim that in policy making processes there always should be a 'collection and analysis' stage where different stakeholders are involved. This is a process where 'policy-makers, scientists and experts, industries, trade unions, NGOs, patient organisations, citizens' panels ... have different roles to play ' (ibid.:454) . When authorities are making policy decisions in a field, not only scientific reports and evidence are on the table, but a whole variety of knowledge that together is supporting the decision makers. The terms "monitoring knowledge" and "adaptive monitoring", have been used for the type of knowledge used in management of ecosystems similar to this case Likens 2009, 2010) . In such monitoring "the focus has usually been to identify trends (e.g. whether environmental conditions are getting ''better" or ''worse"), according to Lindenmayer and Likens (2010: 6) , who also state that:
Most successful monitoring programs are built on partnerships between people with different but complementary skills. These include scientists, statisticians, policy-makers and resource managers who may be from government and non-government organizations, universities, research institutions and other organizations (ibid.:6).
Thus, monitoring partnerships and knowledge regimes are not only based on one but on several types of knowledge and expertise. A widely used term for such partnerships is "community of practice", referring to the "community" in which the monitoring knowledge is produced. Partnership models and communities of practice fits well with the recent governance traditions on Svalbard (Viken 2006 (Viken , 2011 Viken et al. 2014) , which is a move away from the dominance of hierarchy towards responsive and collaborative governance models. However, not all management proposals emerge within this frame. Svalbard is huge, vulnerable and challenging to manage and to scan scientifically. Therefore also the so called precautionary principle has been used as an argument for restricting the access to parts of the islands.
Two alternative approaches: The precautionary principle and community of practice
The precautionary principle
The precautionary principle is widely accepted as a steering principle in fields such as food management, health management, terrorism, and environmental governance. The principle is used mostly when there is reckoned to be a risk of negative effects of a type of actions, but with lack of evidence for the harmfulness. This is for instance the case concerning mobile phone use in airplanes; as a precaution, it is forbidden, although there is no research evidencing its harmfulness (Kriebel et al. 2001) . This illustrates both an uncertainty concerning knowledge, and the rhetorical power of the principle; despite lack of evidence, people -and indeed a whole industry -take precaution. But often the use of the principle is based on a lack of proofs both of harmful-and harmlessness. This of course also raises the question of the severity of a possible harm, and how big the risk is for it to occur.
There are also several dimensions of the precautionary principle. According to Sandin (1999) , it has four dimensions: threat, uncertainty, action, and command. Without threats there is no reason for precaution, but its likelihood can vary from minor to major. Moreover, the threats can be reversible and irreversible, and it must be preventable for precautionary actions to be defended. Uncertainty (including probability and risk) can often be calculated, but not always. Some therefore say that threats should rather be seen as plausible (Resnik 2003) . There are also tasks that are so complex or complicated that they are trans-scientific.
The action dimension concerns what can be done to reduce or prevent the threats, normally attacking the causes of a harm, and not only the symptoms (ibid.: 894). The command dimension relates to the authority behind a precautionary decision, and its position and legitimacy. But it is to the core of the principle that somebody can make a regulation without or before scientific evidence is established. The essence of this discussion is that the precautionary principle is a solution that can be defended only in a situation with lack of evidence. But there will also be a question of what type of evidence is lacking. Concerning Svalbard, is it evidence related to the state of the art of nature conditions, or evidence concerning human pressure that should be in place, that makes one avoid the precautionary principle from being used? And who are the proponents for the application of the principle?
According to Hagen et al. (2012) , there is a conflict potential among stakeholders if the precautionary principle is seen as a substitute for using existing knowledge. It can be argued that the precautionary principle is based on the shortcomings of science and research (Resnik 2003) . There are also questions related to epistemological positions; what is seen as a risk or a threat within one discipline is not equally regarded within another. Most often, there are alternative frames for understanding the phenomena that are seen as threats, harms, or problems. And in practice, applying the precautionary principle very often has societal and economic implications. For example, a prohibition of an action can mean economic losses for businesses or an industry. For precautionary reasons, a pilot demand for big ships along the west coast of Svalbard was introduced in 2013. This seemed to reduce the overseas cruise activities. However, the ships that leave the fjords of Svalbard due to the practice of the principle go other places; they do not stop their operations. And often, it is argued, the practice of the principle moves the problem to another field that is unknown (ibid.:43). For such reasons, the precautionary principle tends to be contested when applied.
'Communities of practice' and beyond
Knowledge-based management is propagated as a goal for the Northern areas including Svalbard (Ministry of Foreign Affaris 2012). However, it is widely acknowledged that always to operate based on scientific evidence is a Utopia. In most decision making processes scientific evidence is only one of several components in the monitoring of a field. This is accordance with a well-known view in the philosophy of knowledge. As for instance claimed by Dewey (1938) , knowledge is always a combination of abstract reasoning and action oriented considerations. Most decisions are therefore taken on the basis of some sort of collective accordance, or even on the base of a consensus generated of and amongst people working together in tightly knit groups that constitute some sort om "community". According to Dunham, Freeman and Lietka (2006) in many decision making processes there are different types of communities or stakeholders involved, as communities of place, communities of interest, virtually advocacy groups and communities of practice. In our case all these types of communities or stakeholder groups may be found, but concerning the environmental and tourism related regulations of Svalbard, 'communities of practice' seems to be the most suitable term (cf. Brown and Duguid 1998) . Within 'communities of practice' learning is situated and created in processes where the socio-cultural dynamic of learning is prominent (Lave and Wenger 1991) . Through working together, a 'community of practice' develops a shared understanding of its practice, of how to do it, and of how this practice relates to other communities and their practices. In such communities of practice tacit and explicit knowledge interact (Nonaka and Krogh 2009): "An explicit form of knowledge is objective, rational, and created in the then and there, wheras a tacit form is actionable, subjective, experiential, and created in the here and now. Tacit knowledge is acquired with little or no direct instruction, it is procedural, and above all, practically useful" (Sternberg et al. 1995, quoted in Nonaka and Krogh, op.cit, p. 641 ).
Nonaka and Krogh argue that tacit and explicit knowledge should not be seen as separate entities but rather as mutually complementary and based on the same continuum (ibid.: 640).
Knowledge and practice are intricately involved; the practice develops an understanding, which can reciprocally change the practice and extend the community. However, 'communities of practice' is an ambiguous concept, as such communities are not homogenous 'social objects' (Handley et al. 2006) , and they may come in various forms, depending on the actual case, the kinds of knowledge, and the actors involved (Amin and Roberts 2008) . They are heterogeneous across several dimensions such as geographical spread, lifecycle, and pace of evolution, and individuals may also participate in loose 'networks of practice' across organizational boundaries (Brown and Duguid 1998) . The definition of "truth" resulting from such processes may be contested.
The 'practical wisdom' of professionals in the 'communities of practice' (Head 2008: 6) that often operate within and across public and private sectors, represents an often ignored alternative expertise. This expertise is not primarily from scientists or researchers, but constitutes a 'diverse range of professionals and paraprofessionals who are engaged in direct service provision' (ibid: 6), working within 'communities of learning', evolving knowledge that 'also tend[s] to become systematized and codified, and linked to standard formats and guidelines' (ibid.). For these experts scientific knowledge is only one of several premises for planning and policy decisions. Their formal bodies of knowledge evolve, and are subject to debate in 'communities of learning', but they also tend to become systematized and codified, and linked to standards and guidelines (ibid.:7). To know how science and other expertise can best be transformed to evidence-based premises requires what Head (ibid.: 5) calls political knowledge: knowing the political system, processes, and legitimate tools.
Based on this discussion, the question to be followed up here is as follows: in situations where scientific knowledge is missing or inadequate, is there an alternative to the precautionary principle? We argue that where relevant 'communities of practice' exist, and that they might come up with an alternative relevant and applicable monitoring knowledge. In the tourism industry, knowledge sharing is boundary-less, it is maintained (McLeod et al. 2010 ). Tourism actors are most places part of formal and informal networks which have knowledge sharing capabilities. In the case discussed below the social practice is the sharing of knowledge about the environment of Svalbard. How effective this knowledge sharing is, depends on knowledge brokers and translators, and the willingness to accept the knowledge.
The case study
Svalbard is an archipelago about 1,000 kilometers north of the Norwegian mainland, half the way to the North Pole. Due to icy conditions, the northeastern parts of the islands have been more or less inaccessible, only with open sea in late August and early September, and there are heavy restrictions on all traffic, including snow-mobiles. The only group that has had some form of activity in the area is scientists, but even research activities have been low compared to other parts of Svalbard. This is about to change, as the sea ice is melting more rapidly than anyone has expected, opening up the area for traffic, particularly in the summer time. Tourism is a fast growing activity in Svalbard, cruise tourism in particular and the tourist industry is eager to explore new areas. East Svalbard is in this respect an interesting new area, for individual tourists travelling both by boat and smaller cruise ships. More regulation and management of the area have come into focus. The area has been preserved as a nature reserve since 1973, but not completely closed for all visitors. In the Svalbard Environmental Act (from 2002) the ideas of the precautionary principle are prevalent: if the government thinks an activity can harm the environment, it can be stopped or rejected. And it was also this principle that was stated when East Svalbard in 2005 was suggested to be closed for almost all human activities. In the protection guidelines from 1985, it is defined as a socalled 'reference area' for science. This is not a clearly defined term, but is normally understood as an area that in the future is meant to stand out as untouched by human activities, thus being an area that can be compared with similar areas where human activities have taken place. Thus, such a research environment will have some of the qualities of a laboratory. To obtain this, a closure of the area is preferred, as parts of the research and management community see it. Despite this paragraph in the guidelines, the area has been accessible. The argument for a closure in 2005 was the fast-growing interest in new visits to the area. If this continued; the area would lose its character as being untouched and become of less value as a 'reference area', it was argued.
A case study following the planning process involving all the stakeholders in the area conducted in 2013 became a passage into a broader understanding of the construction of knowledge of relevance in the governance of this unpopulated part of Svalbard. Starting with the planning documents, including the hearings from a number of stakeholders, these documents revealed an ongoing and partly intense discourse between key actors in the field of knowledge construction related to Svalbard. They also identified a number of contested issues and a discussion of valid knowledge, a controversy that also split the scientific community, it was not a conflict between scientist and business actors in the tourist industry only. This discourse was followed up through open-ended interviews with eleven key informants. These interviews did not only give us first hand insight into the motives and arguments from the stakeholders on different parts of the suggested regulations, but also what we might call "stories of practice" (Flyvbjerg, 2006) , the type of reflective and fluid knowledge that is prevalent amongst experts. Stories of practice are narratives, constructed out of material events and achievements; they are contextualized in place, in time, in institutional structures and problem domains, and they are directed at a particular community of practice (Dredge, Jenkins and Withford, 2011:48) . The interviewees were from AECO (Association of Arctic Expeditions Cruise Operators), the Governor's office, Lokalstyret (the Local Council), Norwegian Polar Institute (two persons), Svalbard Museum, the Ministry of Justice, the local tourism industry, and a two local individuals without any formal connection to the case in question. Except for these two, all interviewees were stakeholders with central positions in the processes described. The stories of practice have also been supported by observations on field trips with scientists, and through talks with people engaged in production of a set of guidelines for AECO, the Arctic cruise ship organization, and some of the cruise ship guides. .
Regulation of East Svalbard
A suggested closure and a management plan process There were several reasons why the issue concerning the management of East Svalbard was introduced in the early 2000s. The Norwegian Ministry of Environment created a working group at a 'directorate' level to judge 'the vulnerability of the different natural and cultural values on Svalbard in relation to the growing cruise tourism, and … to make a proposal of how the ship and cruise tourism should be regulated' (internal note, 2005:1). Their proposal was basically to forbid travel in most of East Svalbard, and the argument was strictly to keep it as a reference area for natural sciences, climate change research in particular.
The proposal was acclaimed by the Norwegian Inter-Ministerial Polar Committee, and passed over to the Governor of Svalbard for implementation. Although large parts of the area were already preserved as national reserves, the suggestion represented a severe change in the management regime. Before, the area was protected but allowed access; now, it should in practice be closed, except for a certain number of visitor sites. After some modification, the proposal was sent to a hearing among involved stakeholders. The proposal provoked many, and in particular the cruise tourism industry, an industry with long traditions for visiting the area. Within the scientific community the proposed regulation was interpreted as an exclusion of research milieus as the local university studies (Unis -The University Centre in Svalbard).
The public in general was both provoked by the reduced access to land and sea areas, and by the way the proposal had been introduced. For some of the same reasons, the editor of the only local newspaper argued against the proposal, supported by several readers' letters as well (cf. Larsen 2012).
When the proposal was presented the cruise tourism's organization, AECO, protested loudly, and started to make allies with many actors sharing its view, covering all from people on Svalbard to politicians in the Parliament and foreign embassies. The Governor of Svalbard was probably not happy with the proposal and observed the protests from different interests.
After a couple of years and several hearings, the proposal was put aside and a process of developing a management plan for East Svalbard started. Management plans are well-known conservation tools in Norway, where there is a procedure to clarify in what ways a preserved area can be used and how the conservation decisions should be interpreted.
When the first amendment was launched in 2005, the authorities tried to implement it through the formal, hierarchical procedures. Locally, people felt that the newly implemented local democracy was contested. Also, staff members at the Governor's office felt that the process was conducted in a form that conflicted against the adaptive management culture (as it is called locally) that had been developed (Viken 2006) . Thus, the Governor decided to open up the management plan process, and to involve those having defined interests in the case. Therefore, but also for the sake of the knowledge bases that these different parts held, it was decided to establish four working groups, as well as a reference group to discuss and suggest elements that should go into the management plan. The stakeholder groups concerning the management plan for East Svalbard were 1) a science and education group, 2) a tourism industry group, 3) a local community group, and 4) a fishery group. The Governor put together the suggestions from the groups, and made an encompassing hearing.
In the following, the call for evidence and application of the precautionary principle will be discussed, as these elements appear in the process of developing a new management regime for East Svalbard. It will be shown how different stakeholders demand evidence, and how the precautionary principle tends to be called upon as a substitute.
The precautionary model being challenged
The authorities' overall policy in governing Svalbard has for long been that it shall be based on scientific and certified knowledge. This is supported by the Norwegian Institute of Nature Research (NINA) (Vistad et al. 2008 ) that in a report argues the following:
One should aim at moving away from a 'precautionary principle'-based management towards a knowledge-based management system. The management regime needs legitimacy and acceptance of its decisions; this increases the need for scientific knowledge as the fundament for decisions and priorities. (Vistad et al. 2008:103, our translation) However, such knowledge is only partly available, and is particularly lacking in East Svalbard. East Svalbard is however not a 'black-box'. A large number of scientific research projects have been conducted over the years, particularly research on ice conditions, monitoring of bird colonies, polar bears, and the marine environment. A complete picture of the 'state of the art' is, however, not available. Certified (peer-reviewed) scientific knowledge is therefore fragmented, sporadic, and partly completely lacking as the territory has been completely covered with ice almost all year round until recently. Besides, only part of the research knowledge is useful for management. Much of the research that exists is of the meditative type: conducted for the research community, peer-reviewed, and not necessarily relevant for making policy decisions. To some, and in particular the Norwegian Polar Institute (NPI), which has an advisory status concerning Svalbard, the lack of research-based knowledge gives way to the precautionary principle and stronger protection:
The precautionary principle is a superior principle in the Svalbard Environmental Act, as well as in the mandate from the Ministry of Environment where this principle is to be the foundation for management.
The principle implies that if there is insufficient knowledge about the value of nature or effects of activity the areas are to be managed aiming at avoiding possible environmental damage. In the proposal the precautionary principle is set aside as the leading management principle…NPI agrees that a complete knowledge-based management should be the goal; however, in a natural reserve, where the point of departure is a strict preservation regime, the precautionary principle must be the foundation as long as knowledge is insufficient to draw a clear conclusion about the opposite. (NPI, hearing utterance)
To be sure that there are no damaging or degrading processes going on, one needs time series data on all fields that potentially can be affected. This is a difficult demand. In lack of such knowledge, closure seems to be the preferred alternative for many natural scientists. With no human activities, there will be no traces, and human-posed pressure or environmental problems will not appear. And the stance is legitimated with the widely known and accepted precautionary principle. The cruise ship industry and its organization, AECO, argue on the other hand that their visits to the area are environmentally friendly and hardly do not set any footprints at all. This is also acclaimed by an assessment of tourism in the area, conducted by NINA that, in a report, claims the following:
The environmental effects of tourism in the Arctic are relatively insignificant. The critique against human influence seems often to build more on attitudes than on facts. The fear of environmental effects seems to be greater than the actual knowledge about them. (Vistad et al. 2008:34, our translation) Thus, according to NINA, there is no research-based evidence that Arctic nature is significantly threatened by the low-level activities that have been going on. Based on this, the tourism industry claimed that the first proposal was based on socially constructed problems, and not on evidence. The suggested closure meant a loss of freedom for the industry to choose landing sites, and a loss of sites for field studies for research institutions as well, and of course also a lost recreational area for individual travelers, including a few locals. They saw no need for calling upon the precautionary principle. The prevailing suggestion, which the management plan produced in 2012, also suggests some restrictions that, it is argued, are lacking basis in evidence, among these being a closure of a group of islands called Tusenøyane. This is done despite no scientific evidence of the tourism activities doing any harm. It is not surprising that the status and significance of the precautionary principle versus scientific knowledge has been among the debated issues in the debates accompanying these decision processes. The defenders of closure used the precautionary principle because of lack of evidence of the nature conditions, and the opponents blamed them for not having evidence for their activities being a threat to nature.
Site-specific knowledge production
Knowledge-based management in Svalbard presupposes relevant monitoring data. For instance, the lack of data on vegetation, cultural heritage, and fauna has been pointed out on several occasions. Hagen et al. (2012) emphasize that "site-specific management is not possible without knowledge of specific abundances at the individual sites. Such information is available for only a limited number of visitor sites at Svalbard". As to cultural heritage they describe the situation as the following: "The lack of precise data concerning the technical condition of the historic structures and the historic values of the sites makes it impossible to develop site-specific management actions at the present state" (ibid.: 9). It is also argued that collecting relevant monitoring data within a limited number of sites presupposes a broad and multidisciplinary approach (ibid.). In a situation with increasing tourism on Svalbard, Hagen Other forms of data and data gathering systems exist and reflect practices that have existed for long, but might not be considered 'scientific'. Most important is a system with socalled 'field inspectors', a system with a few persons placed in the field for the summer season, working similar to 'park rangers' with information, policing and reporting, and monitoring voyages. Another is a voyage (tokt) organised by the Governor of Svalbard going around the islands making field inspections. The ship (for 10 years the ship was Nordsyssel) is staffed with administratively and scientifically trained people who pay visits to a series of places along the coast, surveying the nature and heritage conditions on a regular basis. There are two types of such expeditions: one that is initiated by a certain department and having a particular focus, another lasting for three weeks staffed with people from the Governor's Office, carrying boats and a helicopter for on-land observations. There may also be particular experts on board to monitor a particular issue. In 2011 and 2012, experts on PCB were taking part, making a report concerning the appearance of the toxic in surface soil (Eggen and Ottesen 2012) . Further, for more than 10 years local inhabitants have been invited to join a voyage to the Svalbard coasts for cleaning up beaches and the coastal areas. These three examples are not schematically planned data gatherings, and neither are the reports from the field inspections very systematical, it is maintained. And most reports are not open to the public. But still the monitoring tours add to an evidence-based management system. As these measures are a yearly occurrence, there is evidence from a long period in many fields. In addition, the Governor receives mandatory reports from the tourist companies, and local people and other travelers inform about incidents and observed changes in the environment.
Often the tourist industry makes additional reports from visitor sites, done by scientists or experienced and academically trained experts on board. A representative of the tourism industry is however confused about the fact that this knowledge is not always seen as valid by the authorities:
AECO's members visit the area annually and frequently -and much more often than researchers. They have since years made fauna observations and submitted to research institutions and the authorities. But, obviously, there is viable local and experience-based knowledge that adds to the evidence-platform for management. Compared to meriting research, this evidence is broader in scope and, as most actors see it, constitutes a solid basis for management. This type of data gathering has been a platform for management more or less during all the 90 years of Norwegian sovereignty and management of the islands. Also, the tourism industry takes part in the environmental management of Svalbard.
AECO has for instance constructed site-specific guidelines for the cruise industry. During the summer of 2011, site guidelines for the west coast were produced, and in summer 2012, correspondingly, for the east coast (AECO 2014). One of the authors of this article took part in the 2011 event as an observer. The guidelines were produced during a voyage from site to site (nine in all) along the coast. On board the ship was the project team (six persons), including the general secretary of AECO, experts in ornithology (two), botany (one) and heritage (one), a journalist, two observers (a representative of the sponsoring body and a tourism professor), and a group of information officers and art designers (six). The art designers, together with the experts and the journalist, were supposed to design the guideline material and web-sites during the tour. In all the sites visited, the landing took place by using a zodiac. Ornithologists scanned the area before the group as a whole was set ashore to produce an inventory for each site with regard to flora, fauna, and heritage. Talks with tourists and guides at sites visited indicated that such guidelines were welcomed. As a guide saw it, it is better to refer to an organisation than give orders on behalf of oneself. The guidelines and the establishment of them was also a topic in their meetings (daily recaps) with the passengers. But, primarily, this is an example of self-regulation imposed by the cruise tourism industry, and of a non-scientific but systematic gathering of information about site conditions. This monitoring and recording practice is undertaken in cooperation between the tourist industry and scientists, including employees from the Governor's Office that can be seen as a 'community of practice'. The observations and information was gathered and discussed, and the observers agreed upon a site report. Thus, the information gathered and the knowledge created, was shared and exchanged within the group present on that particular site and on the ship. As the participants also represented the ship owner and tour operation companies, the knowledge acquired and the guidelines produced were shortly afterwards disseminated among relevant actors. The knowledge they enhanced shares many of the characteristics of a 'community of practice', such as being social, being based on a shared engagement, using a common methodology as their tool, having a similar background, knowing the field, and sharing a discourse reflecting a certain perspective on the world (cf. Amin and Roberts 2008) . Such collective practices lead to forms of collective knowledge, shared sense making, and a distributed understanding. The particular form of situated social practice, learning and knowing taking place at these visits, illustrated the hybridity of 'communities of practice', characterised by a mixture of close and detached connectivity, temporary local coalitions, and institutional and professional ties that are not reducible to local space.
The AECO example diverts from the site inspections done by the Governor's office, as it is more specifically oriented towards a particular mission: the production of guidelines.
Moreover, a particular methodology was applied, and the data were systematically stored.
However, the data were not scientifically produced, validated, or reported. Data were adjusted to the purpose of the project, which was to assess the environmental condition for each site, and on this basis to produce a set of guidelines. According to AECO, this is done to create a more sustainable practice, self-management, and a more responsible governance of the islands.
Discussion
In this article we have touched upon a whole series of approaches and terms referring to knowledge. Scientific, formal, or abstract knowledge is one, while as it is argued, expert knowledge is much broader, covering knowledge based on both professional skills and skilled practice and experience. Our point is that there is a quite encompassing evidence base for the management of Svalbard, both within and outside protected areas. There is a stock of evidence, produced through different 'communities of practice', that support the management of the islands. It is a monitoring knowledge, based on expert surveillance. Our observation is that this knowledge base is not having the same prestige as scientific knowledge, although it is just as important for the management of the islands. Data and information are often poorly reported, lack transparency, and could easily be given a more systematic form and an official status. Because of such deficits, those outside tend to blame the Governor for lacking evidence for management measures that are suggested. Paradoxically, this is an argument used both when a new regulation is discussed, and used by its opponents.
As we have used the term 'knowledge', it is seen as something that is embedded in an organization or field of practice (cf. Blackler 1995) . This is in fact one of the problems in many organisations: knowledge is embrained or embodied (ibid.) in individuals, and does not become a common good for some sort of a 'community of practice'. Concerning the case in question, the officers at the Governor's Office are on time-limited contracts, and the systems for transferring and preserving acquired knowledge are not good enough. Too much of the knowledge rest with employees that come and go, it is argued. There is a difference between a 'community of practice' and organisational knowledge. Thus, the quality of a 'community of practice' depends on restoring and retrieving knowledge systems.
It is also a question if the case reported here really is a 'community of practice', in the way this approach tends to be defined (Wenger 1998) . This definition includes practice, community, meaning, and identity, elements that probably are only partly in action within the case studied. The 'community' in this case is probably more like a network, and there are no shared identities. Those being part of it are people that work together on occasions, but represent different professional and epistemological backgrounds. Their common knowledge can be described as a kind of mutual sharing of meaning based on what has been called reflective practices (Buysse et al. 2003: 268) that are 'derived from professionals' own experiences and observations as well as from explicit knowledge gained through theory and research. For the Svalbard case and the inspection voyages, management staff members make the observations -gather the data -occasionally assisted by researchers and other types of experts. As within most 'communities of practice', there will be different interpretations of facts, and there is not only one way of transforming facts into practices. It has also been argued that the element of common practice -doing things together -often is more central than the community element (Contu and Willmott 2003) . To put it another way, to know how, and to act, is more central than feelings of unity or identity (cf. Duguid 2005) . However, the knowledge produced within the frame of field inspection will often be based on some sort of consensus, as was done in the AECO project, reported above.
A severe obstacle for monitoring knowledge to become acknowledged relates to power. Abstract, formal, and scientific knowledge have strong positions as "real" knowledge and also the type of knowledge the Governor of Svalbard is asking for. The majority of advisory and hearing institutions in the East Svalbard planning process are also found within this disciplinary field. The attitudes towards alternative knowledge as the monitory knowledge from the Governor's field inspection tours, are clearly demonstrated in a recent report from the Norwegian Polar Institute, which comments on the form of the results from '… round trips and field inspection… The registrations are not done regularly, and lack documentation of methods and the basis for the data' (NPI 2013: 124, our translation). There are whole series of obstacles hindering the type of knowledge to attain a corresponding position, some reflected in the above quote. However, despite less systematically data gathered this is the type of knowledge that for decades has been reckoned as good enough and applied in the management of Svalbard. This practice fits well with a strongly acknowledge principle in decision making theory; when it is impossible to be fully informed, the goal should rather be to obtain a satisfactory level or what has been called 'administrative knowledge' (Simon 1976 ). The challenge is to get this type of knowledge recognised and given prestige as a valid evidence base for environmental decision-making and planning. The way towards a higher status for this type of knowledge, is probably to adopt some of the systematics of the natural sciences, but collecting information -monitoring -through use of different type of (nature) environmental scanning technics. Lindenmayer and Linkens (2009: 483) suggest the term "adaptive monitoring" to be used for surveillance and management of ecosystems. Inspired by their systematics, we suggest a monitoring based management system that is responsive, in that it also involves human activities and stakeholders. Such a program should; (i) map and involve all stakeholder groups or communities of interest; (ii) address well-defined questions that are specified before the commencement of a monitoring; (iii) be underpinned by a systematic method for scanning sites and landscapes (as the AECO model); (iv) include available scientific knowledge concerning nature and culture conditions and changes; (v) accept a human need to know and take part in management of their natural surroundings (responsive management) so that they 'pass the test of management relevance' (ibid.). Such a model can be modified and adapted to the circumstances, for instance at EastSvalbard it should be balanced towards a very vulnerable nature, but also long traditions with cruise based tourism. Applying and adapting this model would at the same time represent some sort of responsive management, which is strongly asked for on Svalbard (Viken et al. 2014 ). As it is today, the natural sciences have a hegemonic position, and tend to define what knowledge that is valid and relevant. But as this article shows, this hegemony is contested by many stakeholders, and that alternative knowledge exists and can be produced, as the type of monitoring knowledge that the Governor of Svalbard's own field inspections provide, robust enough to have been the ground of for the management of Svalbard for decades. With some modification and more transparency, this should be a complementary and valued knowledge also in the future.
Conclusion
The analysis of the planning process of East Svalbard has uncovered an ongoing power struggle about the legitimacy of different forms of knowledge in managing this part of the Arctic. There obviously is a struggle about competence between the institutions that produce and translate knowledge into policy decisions. The case reported here reveal conflicts not about knowledge as such, but about what form of knowledge the management regime should be based upon. There is wide accordance of the fact that all natural elements cannot regularly be measured, and not in every part of a huge environment as Svalbard. Still, it is argued that to apply the precautionary principle in order to limit access is not a good alternative. It tends not to be accepted and therefore lacks legitimacy. There is a long history of tourism practices in the area, but harms or threats of the natural environments that relates to these activities, have only rarely been scientifically documented. Therefore, it is argued, monitoring knowledge for which there is a long tradition to use as a decisional platform, constitutes a viable alternative. It is knowledge produced by (different) 'communities of practice', for long accepted as sufficient for a sustainable management of Svalbard, and suites a demand for responsive management. Natural sciences will always have a place in such communities, but their representatives are not alone and expected to communicate with other expertise and the wider community. Science of today have to be created in dialogue with the surrounding society. Nowotny et al. (2003: 194) claim that "[i]ncreasing permeability provides bases for greater contextualization, by opening up the number of routes along which society can speak back to science." One problem with this dialogue and with alternative knowledge is lack of prestige. This article has demonstrated a way in which this knowledge production could be ameliorated and gain more respect. But the position of alternative expertise, it is moreover argued, is also weak because the natural sciences for decades have had a hegemonic position in environment management issues. This seems to be about to change.
